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Abstract 
An incorporated company has neither body nor mind of its own.  It can only exercise such powers as it possesses 
through the directors and other organs empowered by the articles to act on its behalf. This paper examines the 
division of powers between corporate organs in public companies in three jurisdictions, namely, Nigeria, the 
United States of America and Germany. It states that the German model has marked differences from the Nigerian 
and American models. It concludes that German corporation law shows more concern for workers as the principle 
of codetermination demonstrates. However, the management board which is the organ responsible for formulating 
corporate policy and transacting corporate business is responsible only to a supervisory board rather than to 
account directly to the shareholders for its conduct as in Nigeria and the United States. It suggests more 
participation of shareholders and workers in corporate governance in Nigeria. 
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I. Introduction 
An incorporated company has been aptly described as a mere “abstraction.”1 If so, the legal personality enjoyed 
by an incorporated company is a legal fiction.  This is because an incorporated company has neither body nor mind 
of its own.  It can only exercise such powers as it possesses through the instrumentality of human beings who 
constitute the organs, officers and agents of the company.2 
In the case of a private company, the shareholders and the directors are usually the same persons.3  However, 
in a public company, the directors may have few shares in the company or they may not have any shares in the 
company, so that management of the company is divorced from its ownership.4 It is to be noted, at this juncture, 
that the public company in English law is the equivalent of the publicly owned corporation in American law and 
the AG (Aktiengesellschaft) in German law.5 
The separation of ownership from management of a company has brought into sharp focus the fundamental 
divergence between the interests of the shareholders and the interests of the board of directors.  In the shareholder’s 
case, these interests include his desire to receive dividends and to have some power of decision over the activities 
of the company.  These interests necessarily conflict with those of the board of directors, which encompass 
retaining a sufficient part of the annual profits for expansion, investment and other business purposes. Moreover, 
most boards of directors do not welcome shareholder participation in corporate management.6 
This paper examines the division of powers between corporate organs in public companies. Three models of 
corporate management are examined. The first is the English/Nigerian model which derives mainly from the 
common law. The second is the American model which deviates slightly from the English model. The third is the 
German model which has marked differences from the English and American models. 
The paper states that German corporation law shows greater concern for workers as the principle of 
codetermination demonstrates. However, the management board which is the organ responsible for formulating 
corporate policy and transacting corporate business is responsible only to a supervisory board rather than to 
account directly to the shareholders for its conduct as in Nigeria, England  and the United States. It suggests more 
participation of shareholders and workers in corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
 
                                                          
1  Lenard’s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd (1915) A.C. 705 at 713 [Lord Haldane] 
2  Ayodele James v. Mid-Motors (Nig) Co. Ltd (1975) 11-12 SC 31 
3  AR Agom, “Shareholders Activism in Corporate Governance” (2000) 4(1) Modern Practice Journal of Finance and Investment Law  252, 
255 
4  GG Otuturu, “Legal Framework for the Management of Modern Companies” (2010) 1(2) Business Law Review 50, 51 
5  LCB Gower, “Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law” (1956) 69 Harvard Law Review 1369, 1376; Ernest C. 
Steefel and Bernhard von Falkenhausen, “The New German Stock Corporation Law” (1967) 52 Cornell Law Quarterly 518. 
6  D. Berger, “Shareholder Rights under German Stock Corporation Act of 1965” (1970) 38 Fordham Law Review 687, 688. 
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II. The Nigerian Model 
The Nigerian model derives principally from the common law of England. At common law, the agency theory was 
applied to the management of partnerships and incorporated companies. In the case of a partnership, each partner 
was presumed to be an agent of the others in the management of the business. In the case of an incorporated 
company, it was presumed that the general meeting was the company itself and that the directors were mere agents 
subject to the control of the members in general meeting.1 
Thus, in A-G v. Davy2 Hardwicke LC said, “It cannot be disputed that whenever a certain number are 
incorporated a major part of them may do any corporate act; so if all are summoned, and part appear, a major part 
of those that appear may do a corporate act.” This principle is said to be at the root of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle3 
where Wigram V-C referred to the members in general meeting as “the supreme governing body.”4  
Accordingly, in Isle of Wright Railway v. Tahourdin5 the Court of Appeal refused the directors of a statutory 
company an injunction to restrain the holding of the general meeting aimed at appointing a committee to reorganize 
the management of the company. Cotton LJ said: 
It is a very strange thing indeed to prevent shareholders from holding a meeting of the 
company when such a meeting is the only way in which they can interfere if the majority of 
them think that the cause taken by the directors in a matter intra vires the directors is not for 
the benefit of the company.6 
However, in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v. Cuminghame7 where the articles vested the power 
to manage the company in the board of directors, the Court of Appeal rejected the contention by the members in 
general meeting that the articles are subject to the general rule that agents must obey the direction of the their 
principals and held that where powers of management had been vested in the board of directors, the general 
meeting could not interfere with their exercise. The court explained that in such a case, the articles constitute a 
contract by which the members had agreed that the “directors and directors alone shall manage.” 
The decision in the cuminghame case marked the beginning of the departure from the old concept which 
regarded the members in general meeting as constituting “the company” itself and the directors as their “agents.”8 
This new approach, which appears to have been generally accepted at the end of the nineteenth century, is that 
where the relevant articles vest the general management of the company in the board of directors, the general 
meeting cannot interfere with a decision of the board of directors unless they are acting contrary to the provisions 
of the Act or the articles.9 
The modern position of the law was brilliantly formulated by the Court of Appeal in Shaw & Sons (Salford) 
Ltd v. Shaw10 where Geer LJ said: 
A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers 
may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors; certain other powers may be reserved 
for the shareholders in general meeting. If powers of management are vested in the directors, 
they and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body of the 
shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by 
altering their articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the 
directors of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which 
by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors usurp the powers vested 
in the general body of shareholders.11 
The Nigerian Companies Act 1968, like the English Companies Act 1948, did not reflect the development in 
the common law. Article 80 of Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act 196812 provides to the effect 
that “the business of the company shall be managed by the board of directors ... who may exercise all such powers 
of the company as are not, by the Act or by these regulations required to be exercised by the company in general 
meeting, subject, nevertheless, to any of these regulations, to the provisions of the Act and to such regulations, not 
been inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed by the company in general 
meeting ...” 
However, the developments in the common law were adopted and applied by the appellate courts in Nigeria13 and 
                                                          
1  PL Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (7ed, Sweet &Maxwell, 2003) 300 
2  (1971) 2 Atk 212 
3  (1943) 2 Hare 461 
4  Ibid 493 
5  (1883) 25 Ch. 320 
6  Ibid 329 
7  (1906) 2 Ch. 34 
8  LS Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law (6ed, Butterworths, 1996) 211 
9  Quin & Axtens v. Salmon (1909) 1 Ch. 311 [CA]; (1909) AC 442 [HL] 
10  (1935) 2 KB 113 [CA] 
11  Ibid 134 
12  Article 80 of Table A of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 is in pari materia with Article 80 Table A of the English Companies Act 1948. 
13  Ukpilla Cement Factory Co. Ltd v. Ugiekhume (1979) 1 FCA 63 [CA]; Okeowo v. Migliore (1979) 11 SC 138 [SC] 
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were codified in the Companies and Allied Matters Act.1 Section 63 of the Act now provides as follows: 
(1) A company shall act through its members in general meeting or its board of directors 
or through its officers or agents, appointed by, or under authority derived from, the members 
in general meeting or the board of directors. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the respective powers of the members in general 
meeting and the board of directors shall be determined by the company’s articles. 
Thus, in line with the position in England,2 the Act empowers a company, by its articles, to create two main 
organs for the purpose of exercising its powers. These are the board of directors and the members in general 
meeting. It has been stated, quite correctly, that what the Act has done is to codify the relevant common law 
principles and also the relevant articles in Table A allowing each organ independent rights to exercise its powers 
in accordance with the Act.3 It is intended to examine the respective powers of the board of directors and the 
members in general meeting. 
 
A. Board of Directors: 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act, like its English Companies Act, provides that “except as otherwise 
provided in the company’s articles, the business of the company shall be managed by the board of directors who 
may exercise all such powers as are not required by the Act or the articles to be performed by the members in 
general meeting.”4 Thus the powers of the company are shared between the members in general meeting and the 
board of directors. 
The Act also provides that “when acting within the powers conferred on them by the Act or the articles, the 
board of directors shall not be bound to obey the directions or instructions of the general meeting: provided that 
they acted in good faith and with due diligence.”5  This proviso invariably gives the majority of shareholders in 
general meeting some supervisory powers or control over the activities of the board of directors so long as such 
supervision or control is not contrary to any provisions of the Act or the articles of association.  
However, the board of directors are not bound to obey the directions or instructions of the general meeting 
when they are acting in good faith and with due diligence.  In other words, the general meeting cannot interfere in 
the management of the business of the company when the board of directors are acting in good faith and with due 
diligence.  
Thus in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cunninghame (supra) the members in general 
meeting directed the sale of the assets of the company by an ordinary resolution contrary to a special resolution 
required by the articles. It was held that the board of directors were not bound to obey the directions. The Court of 
Appeal stated that the division of powers between the board of directors and the general meeting depended entirely 
on the construction of the articles and that where powers had been vested in the board of directors, the general 
meeting could not interfere with their exercise. 
Although board members are elected by the members in general meeting to represent them as a group, legally 
speaking, they are not agents required to carry out the direct orders of the members in general meeting. They are 
more akin to elected members of parliament who represent their constituencies but make decisions according to 
their own best judgement.6 
In practice, the specific matters for which the board of directors has responsibility include the following: 
(a) Defining the company’s strategic goals and ensuring that its human and financial resources are effectively 
deployed towards attaining those goals; 
(b) Overseeing the effective performance of the management in order to protect and enhance shareholder 
value and to meet the company’s obligations to its employees and other stakeholders; 
(c) Ensuring that the company carries on its business in accordance with its Articles and Memorandum of 
Association and in conformity with the laws of the country; 
(d)
 Defining a framework for the delegation of its authority or duties to Management specifying matters that 
may be delegated and those reserved for the Board;  
(e) Observing the highest ethical standards and on an environmentally sustainable basis.7 
                                                          
1  Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (hereinafter simply referred to as CAMA). 
2  See the English Companies Act 1985 (as amended by the Companies Act 1989), Article 70 of Table A, which contains similar provisions. 
The Companies Act 1985 has been replaced by the Companies Act 2006, which makes the powers of the directors only “subject to the 
articles”; see Article 4 of the Model Articles. 
3  EM Asomugha, Company Law in Nigeria under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (Tona Micro Publishers Ltd, 1994) 50; ; EO 
Akanki (ed), Essays on Company Law (University of Lagos Press, 1992) 116; JO Orojo, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria (5ed, 
LexisNexis, 2008) 99. 
4  CAMA, s. 63(3)  
5  Ibid, s. 63(4). 
6  Otuturu (n4) 52 
7  Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria (Securities and Exchange Commission 2011) 10; see also OA Osunbor, 
The Bank Director and the Law (Financial Institutions Training Centre, 2008) 90. 
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B. General Meeting: 
The powers reserved to the members in general meeting by the Act are enormous.1 The shareholders participate in 
management of the company through the annual general meetings of the company where they exercise their right 
to vote and to have a say in major strategic decisions of the company. For example, decisions of the board of 
directors on mergers and acquisitions, 2  declaration of dividends, 3  capitalization of profits and reserves 4  and 
voluntary winding up5 are subject to approval by the members in general meeting. 
The shareholders also elect the directors of the company6 at the annual general meeting. This power to elect 
directors also carries with it the power to remove7 or refuse to re-elect directors with whose performance they are 
not satisfied.8 This power of the members in general meeting to control the exercise of directors’ powers was 
succinctly stated by Greer LJ in the English case of Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw (supra) in the following 
words: 
[T]he only way in which the general body of shareholders can control the exercise of the 
powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering the articles, or if the opportunity 
arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors whose action they disapprove.9 
However, the power of the members in general meeting to alter the articles10 is subject to section 63(6) of the 
Act which provides that “no alteration of the articles shall invalidate any prior act of the board of directors which 
would have been valid if that alteration had not been made.” The effect of this subsection is that an alteration 
cannot be retroactive. Thus, the general meeting cannot alter the articles so as to invalidate what was valid at the 
time it was done.11 Also the power of the general meeting to remove a director is without prejudice to the director’s 
right to sue for damages.12 
In addition, section 63 provides specific instances where the members in general meeting may exercise their 
supervisory powers over the activities of the board of directors. It provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (3) of this section, the members in general 
meeting may – 
(a) Act in any matter if the board of directors are disqualified or are unable to act 
because of a deadlock on the board of directors or otherwise; 
(b) Institute legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company, if the board 
of directors refuse or neglect to do so; 
(c) Confirm or ratify any action taken by the board of directors; or  
(d) Make recommendations to the board of directors regarding actions to be taken by the 
board.13 
The first instance is where the board of directors are disqualified or unable to act because of a deadlock on 
the board. This is a codification of the decision in the English case of Barron v. Potter14 where the articles gave 
the directors power to appoint an additional director and, owing to differences between the directors, no board 
meeting could be held for that purpose. It was held that the general meeting could appoint additional directors. 
The second instance is where the board of directors refuse or neglect to institute legal proceedings in the name 
or on behalf of the company.  In Ladejobi v. Odutola Holdings Ltd 15  one of the issues that came up for 
determination was who, as between the board of directors and the general meeting, had the power to authorize the 
company to commence action in court in the light of section 63 of the Act. The Court of Appeal held that although 
by virtue of subsection (2) of section 63, the power to manage the business of the company is vested in the board 
of directors, by virtue of subsection (5) all the same or nevertheless, the general meeting retains the power to 
determine whether legal proceedings may be instituted in the name of the company. Ademola JCA (as he then was) 
said: 
In construing the whole of section 63 of CAMA, the irresistible conclusion is that the powers 
of management or control of the company in so far as they affect the institution of litigation 
                                                          
1  See generally, RR Pennington, Company Law (2ed, Butterworths, 1967) 481. 
2  Investment and Securities Act 2007, s. 121(5); see also Regulation of Mergers, Takeovers, Acquisitions and Combinations, rule 228(g). 
3  CAMA, s. 379 
4  Ibid, s. 383 
5  Ibid, s. 457 
6  Ibid, s. 248 
7  Ibid, s. 262 
8  KB Omidire, “The Rights and Responsibilities of Shareholders at Annual General Meetings” (1999) 1 Modus International Law and 
Business Quarterly 18, 19 
9  Supra 464 
10  CAMA, s. 48 
11  Orojo (n22) 101 
12  Southern Foundries Ltd v. Shirlaw (1940) AC 701 
13  CAMA, s. 63(5) 
14  (1914) Ch. 895 
15  (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt. 753) 121 
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in the company’s name are vested in the general meeting.1 
The third instance is to ratify or confirm any action taken by the board of directors. In the case of Bamford v. 
Bamford2 the directors of Bamford Ltd allotted 50, 000 unissued shares of the company to F & H Company to 
avoid a takeover by JC Bamford (Excavators) Ltd. The articles gave the directors power to make allotment. A 
director who voted against the resolution sought a declaration that the allotment had not been made for the 
company’s benefit. Before the action was heard, the action was ratified by the general meeting.  
The English Court of Appeal held that the allotment was valid and had been properly ratified by the general 
meeting. The court stated that, provided the directors’ act is not ultra vires, even if in breach of duty, it may, after 
full disclosure, be ratified by the company in general meeting. 
The final instance is to make recommendations to the board of directors regarding action to be taken by the 
board of directors. However, as the term “recommendations” suggests, and in view of section 63(4) of the Act, the 
board of directors are not bound to obey such recommendations provided they are acting in good faith and with 
due diligence unless the resolution is by a special resolution of the in general meeting which will amount to an 
alteration of the articles.3 
It has also been argued that the power to remove directors4 overlaps with the power to give instruction. This 
is because the disgruntled shareholders can say to the directors, “If you choose not to follow our ways, we will by 
ordinary majority seek to remove you from office.” This, in effect, can induce the directors to follow the 
instructions of the general meeting.5 
 
III. The American Model 
American corporation law, unlike its Nigerian and English counterparts, vary from one State to another.  Most 
state statutes follow closely the English model by providing that the business of the corporation “shall be managed 
by a board of directors.” These provisions have been interpreted to mean that the directors must become involved 
in the detailed administration of the corporation’s affairs.6 
However, recent developments have made such an expectation unreasonable in modern corporations.  Notable 
among these developments is the advent of outside directors, who are individuals from outside the corporate 
management and not otherwise involved with the corporation.7   
 
A. Board of Directors: 
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act8 seeks to clarify board responsibility and bring it into accord with 
the realities of modern corporations, particularly large corporations. Section 18.01(b) now provides as follows: 
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and 
affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of a board of directors, subject 
to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation. 
The new provisions have eliminated any ambiguity regarding the role of the board of directors in formulating 
major management policy as opposed to direct day to day management of the corporation.  Generally, the board’s 
responsibility includes the following: 
(a) Financial decisions such as declaration and payment of dividends to shareholders or the issue of 
authorized shares or bonds; 
(b) Authorization of major corporate policy decisions such as the sale or lease of corporate assets outside the 
regular course of business, the determination of new product lines and the overseeing of major contract 
negotiations and labour-management negotiations; 
(c) Appointment, supervision and removal of corporate officers and other managerial employees and the 
determination of their remuneration.9 
Apart from the initial directors who may be named in the articles, directors are elected at the annual 
shareholders’ meeting and usually hold office until the next annual meeting. However, section 8.06 of the RMBCA 
now allows corporations with nine or more members to set staggered two or three year terms for directors.  
Most state statutes required a minimum of three directors. However, section 8.03(a) of the RMBCA now 
allows a corporation to appoint only one director. This eliminates the need for single-shareholder corporations to 
                                                          
1  Ibid 158-159 
2  (1970) Ch. 212 
3  PL Davies and SE Worthington, Davies and Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (9ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 389 
4  The power to remove directors by ordinary resolution is contained in the English Companies Act 2006, s. 168. 
5  Davies and Worthington (n44) 389 
6  TW Dunfee, et al, Modern Business Law and the Regulatory Environment (McGraw-Hill Inc., 1996) 784 
7  Ibid 
8  Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1985 Revision) hereinafter simply referred to as RMBCA 
9  KW Clarkson and others, West’s Business Law: Text, Cases, Legal and Regulatory Environment (5ed, West Publishing Company 1991) 
787 
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enlist superfluous directors.1  The RMBCA in section 8.01(c) also permits small corporations with fewer than fifty 
shareholders to dispense with the board of directors. 
 
B. General Meeting: 
In large corporations, shareholders have no direct control over a corporation’s operations.  They cannot command 
the board of directors to undertake an activity or decide a matter in any particular way.2  
Although ultimate control resides with the shareholders, they usually do not participate actively in corporate 
affairs. Under the RMBCA, the shareholders’ participation in corporate management is confined to the following 
areas: 
(a) The annual election or removal of directors;3 
(b) The approval of certain extraordinary transactions such as amendment of the articles of incorporation,4 
mergers and acquisitions,5  sale of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets 6  and voluntary 
dissolution of the corporation.7 
Apart from these statutory roles, shareholders do not participate actively in corporate management.  If they 
are dissatisfied with their investment, they may sell their shares.  However, if the directors have violated the articles 
or otherwise incurred a liability towards the investors, the shareholders may bring a derivative suit against the 
directors to recover any loss on behalf of the corporation or to recoup any loss to their investment.8 
 
IV. The German Model 
A board of directors in the English and American sense, which directs the affairs of a company, is unknown to 
German law.9 Under the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz)10 the power to manage the company is 
divided among three institutions. These are the management board (Vorstand), the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
and the shareholders’ meeting (Hauptversammlung).11 
The power to manage the day to day business of the company and to represent the company, in and out of 
court, in its dealings with third parties is exclusively vested in the management board.  The functions of the 
supervisory board, as the name clearly suggests, are restricted to the supervision of the management board.  The 
supervisory board are in turn dependent on the shareholders, who usually act through resolutions passed at the 
shareholders’ meeting.12   
Members of the management board may not simultaneously sit in the supervisory board and vice versa.13 The 
supervisory board may appoint one or more of its members to the management board if necessary to fill a vacancy 
there.  However, such appointment may not last longer than one year.  
It is necessary to examine the composition and powers of the management board, the supervisory board and 
the shareholders’ meeting.  This will help to bring out the major differences between the management structure of 
companies under English and American law on the one hand and the management structure of companies under 
German law. 
 
A. Management Board 
The effective power to formulate corporate policy and to conduct corporate business is vested in the management 
board, an institutionalized counterpart to the officers of the American corporation. The German management board, 
however, has far greater authority than its American counterpart. 
The members of the management board are appointed by the supervisory board for a maximum term of five 
years, after which they may be reappointed for unlimited, five-year successive periods.14 The articles of association 
of most large companies, however, have a mandatory retirement clause for members of the management board, 
effective after they have reached their sixty-fifth birthday.   
It is permissible to have only one manager for the corporation instead of a whole board.  If a board is appointed, 
                                                          
1  Davies and Worthington (n44) 785 
2  Ibid 775 
3  RMBCA, s. 8.08 
4  Ibid, s. 10.03 
5  Ibid, s. 11.03 
6  Ibid, s. 12.02 
7  Ibid, s. 14.02 
8  Davies and Worthington (n44) 775 
9  Under German law, the term “director” always designates, contrary to English and American practice, a person who holds a leading 
managerial position, who may or may not belong to the management board. 
10  Aktiengesetz of 1965 (Stock Corporation Act of 1965) hereinafter simply referred to as AktG. 
11  Berger (n6) 691 
12  Ernest C. Steefel and Bernhard von Falkenhausen, “The New German Stock Corporation Law” (1967) 52 Cornell Law Quarterly 518, 
526-527 
13  AktG, s. 105(1) 
14  Ibid, s. 84(1) 
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a chairman may be selected from among its members by the supervisory board. He cannot, however, be elected 
by the managers themselves. 
Managers may be dismissed by the supervisory board for “important reasons” among which the statute 
expressly includes serious violations of duty, and incompetence.1 The statute also classifies a lack of confidence 
vote as an important reason for dismissal, unless the vote is arbitrary.2 
The power of the management board to represent the corporation is practically unlimited. Unlike many 
American corporation statutes, the German Stock Corporation Act has no provision making the validity of certain 
transactions subject to shareholder approval.  There are only two exceptions.  The first is the so-called “enterprise 
contract” by which a corporation, in effect, renounces its independence and submits itself to the domination of 
another enterprise, which must be approved by seventy-five per cent of the share capital represented at the 
shareholders’ meeting.3 The second exception applies to transactions between the corporation and individual board 
members. In such transactions, as well as in civil litigation between board members and their corporation, the latter 
can be represented by the supervisory board.4 
However, the articles may provide that transactions of a certain magnitude such as the grant or acceptance of 
loans beyond a certain sum should be executed only with the approval of the supervisory board. Such restrictions 
bind the management board, however, only with regard to the corporation but they are unenforceable against third 
parties. In other words, there is no ultra vires doctrine in German law.5 
 
B. Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board must consist of at least three members and at most twenty-one members as may be provided 
in the articles.6 However, the total number of members must be divisible by three, since one-third of the members 
of the supervisory board must be elected by the labour force.  Members comprising the other two-thirds of the 
supervisory board are elected by the shareholders.7 
Before the principle of codetermination was introduced into German law, all the members of the supervisory 
board were elected by the shareholders. Now this is true only in “family corporations” all the shares of which are 
exclusively held by one natural person or the members of the same family. In addition, no labour representatives 
are required where a corporation has fewer than five employees. In other corporations, one-third of the members 
of the supervisory board must consist of labour representatives who are elected by the employees of the corporation. 
Employees with managerial functions are disqualified from serving as labour representatives on the supervisor y 
board.8 
The position is different in corporations with more than 1, 000 employees which are engaged in coal mining 
or iron and steel corporations. In such corporations, the supervisory board consists of an equal number of 
shareholder and labour representatives and one additional member mutually agreed upon by the two groups.  If 
the two groups cannot agree upon a mutually acceptable person, then the additional member is elected by the 
shareholders’ meeting.9 
Members of the supervisory board may not be elected for a period longer than four years. Renewals are both 
possible and customary. Even before the expiration of his term, a member of the supervisory board elected by the 
shareholders may be removed by them with or without cause by a vote of at least seventy-five percent of the shares 
represented at the meeting. Labour representatives can also be recalled without cause by a vote of seventy-five 
percent of the labour force. This percentage may be reduced to a simple majority by the articles of association but 
cannot be increased.10 
The supervisory board is not permitted to participate actively in the management of the corporation. Its two 
main functions are the appointment or removal of the members of the management board and the supervision of 
the management board.11 The duty of the supervisory board to supervise the activities of the management board 
corresponds to the duty of the management board to supply the supervisory board with complete and correct 
information.   
The supervisory board has the right to inspect fully corporate books, records and inventories.12  It has the 
statutory duty to call a shareholders’ meeting whenever the corporation’s welfare requires it.  It also has two further 
                                                          
1  Ibid, s. 84(2) 
2  Ibid, s. 84(3) 
3  Ibid, s. 293(1) 
4  Ibid, s. 112 
5  Steefel and Falkenhausen (n62) 520 
6  AktG, s. 95 
7  Ibid, s. 101(1) 
8  Eckert “Shareholders and Management: A Comparative View of Some Corporate Problems in the United States and Germany” (1967) 46 
Iowa L R. 12 at pp. 25-26 
9  Ibid 
10  AktG, s. 103(1) 
11  Ibid, s. 111(1) 
12  Ibid, s. 111(2) 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.77, 2018 
 
29 
statutory duties. The first is to represent the corporation in transactions and suits between the corporation and the 
management board. The second is the appointment and dismissal of members of the management board. 
 
C. Shareholders’ Meeting 
A typical shareholders’ meeting under English and American law has been described as a kind of ancient 
meaningless ritual, like some ceremonies that go on with the mace in parliament, at which management paints a 
rosy picture and delivers panegyrics to itself and the shareholders.1 However, the position under German law is 
quite different in that the shareholders’ meeting in German corporation is an institution with statutory powers and 
restrictions.   
There are a number of important transactions for which shareholder approval is required by statute. Thus 
approval by seventy-five percent of the shares represented at the meeting is necessary to amend the articles of 
association, to dissolve or reorganize the corporation, to merge it with another corporation, to transfer corporate 
assets, and to purchase assets within two years after incorporation, the value of which exceeds ten percent of the 
capital stock.2 
Other functions allocated to the shareholders’ meeting which require only a simple majority of votes actually 
cast are the declaration of dividends, appointment and dismissal of the supervisory board, the appointment of 
auditors for the preparation of the annual report or for a special investigation, and the annual exoneration of 
managers and supervisors.3 Questions of business management are outside the jurisdiction of the shareholders’ 
meeting and may be decided by it only upon the request of the management board.4 
There are both regular and special shareholders’ meetings. Regular meetings take place once a year. The 
agenda of such a meeting is normally within the discretion of the management board.  However, the agenda must 
contain two mandatory items, namely the disposition of the final profits of the financial year concerned, and the 
vote of confidence or denial of such vote for the management board and the supervisory board.5  
In addition, shareholders representing five percent or more of the stated capital of the corporation may compel 
the management board to put additional items on the agenda and to submit them to the shareholders’ meeting. 
Special meetings are called either by the management board or the supervisory board whenever the body concerned, 
in its discretion, considers such a meeting necessary for the benefit of the corporation.  Shareholders representing 
five percent or more of the corporate capital may also demand the call of a special meeting at any time.6 
In general, the chairman of the supervisory board is also the chairman of the shareholders’ meeting.  He has 
the right and the duty to preserve the proper function of the meeting, and he may exclude shareholders from the 
meeting who disturb its proper conduct.7 
Unlike the practice under English and American law, German law does not have any requirements as to 
quorum, unless the articles of association expressly provide for them.  Thus a duly convened meeting may pass 
binding resolutions, even if only a minority of the shares are represented therein.8 
However, shareholders’ resolutions must be set forth in a record certified by a judge or a notar.9 The record 
must state the location and the date of the meeting and the name of the judge or notar. Shareholders’ resolutions 
which are not so certified are void.10 After the meeting, the management board must file a certified copy of such 
record with the Commercial Registrar.11 
 
V. Suggestions for Reform 
A modified version of the German model is recommended for Nigeria and other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
Under this model, companies regulations should make it mandatory for all public companies and multinational 
corporations to provide for a two-tier board in their articles of associations, like the German model, but the 
supervisory board should be made to account directly to the general meeting, like the English model. 
The proposed regulations should ensure that membership of the management board and the supervisory board 
does not overlap and it should determine the functions of the management board and the supervisory board. The 
regulations could borrow a leaf from the European Community (Societas Europaea) SE Regulations with respect 
                                                          
1  Berger (n6) 698 
2  AktG, s. 52 
3  Ibid, s. 119(1) 
4  Ibid, s. 119(2) 
5  Ibid, s. 120 
6  Ibid, s. 122(2) 
7  Steefel and Falkenhausen (n62) 540 
8  Ibid 541 
9  The position of a notar in German law is not comparable with that of a Nigerian notary public. His functions go beyond the mere 
authentication of signatures. The German notar is responsible for the validity of the documents executed in his office, and he must give 
advice to the parties regarding the legal effects of their transactions. 
10  AktG, s. 241 
11  Ibid, s. 230(4). The Commercial Registrar is the equivalent of the Registrar of Companies under English law and the Corporate Affairs 
Commission under Nigerian law. 
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to European Companies.1  
Under the SE Regulations, an SE (European Company) has the option to choose in its articles whether to have 
a one-tier board or a two-tier board, consisting of a management organ and a supervisory organ.2 If not for the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the implementation of the SE Regulations in Britain 
could possibly trigger corporate law reforms in Nigeria and other Commonwealth countries. 
It is also suggested that there should be more participation of shareholders in corporate management other 
than merely participating in annual general meetings. In this regard, the recommendation of the joint committee 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission that shareholders holding more 
than 20% of the total issued capital of a public company should have a representative on the board of directors3 
should be given statutory reinforcement. This will give minority shareholders the opportunity to have a say in the 
management of public companies. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) makes it mandatory for all public companies 
(Aktiengesellschaft) to have a two-tier board known as the management board with managerial functions and the 
supervisory board with supervisory functions. By contrast, public companies in England and America have a one-
tier board of directors with both managerial and supervisory functions. Nigeria and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions follow the English model. 
German corporation law shows greater concern for workers as the principle of codetermination demonstrates. 
Under the Aktiengesetz, one-third of the members of the supervisory board are representatives of the workforce. 
By contrast, there is no recognition of the workforce in the organic structure of public companies under English 
and American laws, although the board of directors may consider their interests in making decisions.4 
However, under the Aktiengesetz, the management board which is the organ responsible for formulating 
corporate policy and transacting corporate business is responsible only to the supervisory board rather than to 
account directly to the shareholders for its conduct. This is the paradox in German corporation law. 
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